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We investigated the effect of aptness in the comprehension of copular metaphors (e.g.,
Lawyers are sharks) by Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) patients. Aptness is the extent to which
the vehicle (e.g., shark) captures salient properties of the topic (e.g., lawyers). A group
of AD patients provided interpretations for metaphors that varied both in aptness and
familiarity. Compared to healthy controls, AD patients produced worse interpretations, but
interpretation ability was related to a metaphor’s aptness rather than to its familiarity level,
and patients with superior abstraction ability produced better interpretations. Therefore,
the ability to construct figurative interpretations for metaphors is not always diminished in
AD patients nor is it dependent only on the novelty level of the expression. We show that
Alzheimer’s patients’ capacity to build figurative interpretations for metaphors is related to
both item variables, such as aptness, and participant variables, such as abstraction ability.
Keywords: metaphor, Alzheimer’s disease, figurative language, language comprehension, aptness, familiarity,
abstraction, simile
INTRODUCTION
Why are we so good at understanding metaphors when they
express such obvious falsities? Upon hearing Juliet is the sun,
how should we interpret Romeo’s state of mind? Clearly, what
he intends to express about Juliet (the topic) seems to be easily
understood by attributing to her some property of the sun (the
vehicle)—perhaps that of sheer brightness, uniqueness, or being
vital for life. Although copular metaphors—those with the form
x is y—are pervasive in natural language and explored profusely
in literary works, their comprehension might require consider-
able cognitive effort. This effort may come from different levels
of analysis that metaphors call for, including computing the liter-
ally anomalous meaning (what is said), interpreting properties of
topic and vehicle, and arriving at an interpretation that is assumed
to be close to what the speaker intended to express. Understanding
a metaphor, thus, may engage many systems—from linguistic
parsing and semantic composition to executive functions involved
in attaining an interpretation that goes beyond what the sentence
expresses literally.
We report a study on the interpretation of metaphors by
patients diagnosed with probable Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
Considering the well-documented difficulties that AD patients
have with linguistic processes (e.g., Manouilidou et al., 2009),
semantic memory (e.g., Whatmough and Chertkow, 2002;
Capitani et al., 2003), and working memory, in particular with
executive functions (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1986; Bäckman et al.,
2005), the task of interpreting non-literal sentences might seem
a daunting one for this population. Surprisingly, however, only
four studies to our knowledge have investigated how AD patients
interpret metaphors (Winner and Gardner, 1977; Papagno, 2001;
Amanzio et al., 2008; Maki et al., 2012). These studies differ sub-
stantially in method, language, types of metaphors employed, and
stimulus properties. Only the study by Amanzio et al. (2008), for
example, controlled for level of conventionality, contrasting con-
ventional and familiar metaphors with novel ones. They found
that AD patients have difficulty with novel metaphors, but their
comprehension of conventional metaphors was similar to that of
healthy controls. They suggested that the main reason for the
novel-metaphor impairment in AD might be defective execu-
tive functions and what they called “verbal reasoning,” which
are deemed necessary to compute relations between novel topic-
vehicle combinations. Conventional metaphors, in contrast, were
argued to rely less on executive functions and more on retrieving
an associated meaning from semantic memory1.
In the present study, we investigate the role of another vari-
able in metaphor interpretation by AD patients: aptness. This
variable reflects the degree to which properties of the vehicle
capture properties that are applicable to (or can be predicated
about) the topic. For example, in Lawyers are sharks the vehi-
cle shark by hypothesis activates properties that might be true of
lawyer. Crucially, aptness is independent of conventionality and
familiarity: an unfamiliar metaphor can still be apt based on the
properties of the vehicle that are applicable to the topic; and a
conventional metaphor can be inapt if the common figurative
meaning of the vehicle does not apply to the topic. We also eval-
uated to what degree a patients’ ability to perform abstractions
could predict metaphor interpretation—on the assumption that
abstraction might be required to detach the literal meaning from
the expression and generate an interpretation that approaches the
intended meaning.
1We use “meaning” in a loose sense often to cover both a literal meaning
(roughly, what is said) and the intended message or even what is implicated
by an expression (e.g., “metaphor meaning”), which might differ substantially
from what is literally expressed. When necessary we make adjustments to our
use of “meaning” to reflect these distinctions.
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We start off with a brief discussion on the comprehension of
different types of figurative expressions in AD: proverbs, sarcasm,
idioms, and metaphors. Our main goal is to gather the pattern
of performance of AD patients in diverse types of tests employed
in the investigation of figurative language, and which motivate
our study on metaphor, reported below. A secondary goal of our
discussion on figurative language in AD involves evaluating both
subject and item variables employed in these studies, which is cru-
cial for understanding how a meaning that approximates that of
the intended message is attained and how it may be disrupted
in AD.
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
Thus far, 22 studies have investigated diverse forms of figurative
language in AD—including proverbs, idioms, sarcastic expres-
sions, and metaphors (for a recent review, see Rapp and Wild,
2011)2. What seems to be common to these forms of expression
is that there is a stark contrast between what is said and what
is intended by a token utterance. We follow here a classical dis-
tinction in pragmatics (e.g., Grice, 1989) assuming that what is
said is the literal interpretation of the expression, its composi-
tional meaning based on word meanings and how they combine
structurally.3 We thus take what is intended by a given expres-
sion to be what is implicated (rather than explicated), or what
the speaker intends to express, whether this intention can be
easily calculated (such as the ironic It is hot in here, uttered by
a visitor to Yukon in January) or not (Juliet is the sun). While
this distinction has been well established in many research cir-
cles in cognitive science, what more recent psycholinguistic and
cognitive neuroscience research have shown is that numerous
variables play an important role in the process of calculating the
intended message from what is said (see, e.g., the papers in Gibbs,
2008, and Roncero and de Almeida, 2014 , for reviews).The main
variables of interest include the expression’s familiarity (Blasko
and Brihl, 1997; Thibodeau and Durgin, 2011), conventionality
(Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Bowdle, 2008), and apt-
ness (Chiappe and Kennedy, 1999; Jones and Estes, 2005, 2006;
2We should also note that of the 22 studies on figurative language in AD—the
20 reviewed by Rapp and Wild (2011) and two more recent ones (Yamaguchi
et al., 2011; Maki et al., 2012)—several have employed figurative language
as a diagnostic tool for early dementia (e.g., Code and Lodge, 1987; Santos
et al., 2009; Yamaguchi et al., 2011), while others have actually investigated
the nature of figurative language understanding obtained from the pattern of
linguistic and cognitive deficits in AD. We restrict our discussion to the latter
types, which are more closely related to the present study.
3We will use “semantic composition” or “compositional” to refer to expres-
sions from which a meaning is obtained by computing the (denotational)
meaning of the constituent words and how they combine syntactically. How a
non-compositional meaning is obtained (i.e., a figurative meaning not based
on the words stated) remains a matter of debate. Some have argued that cer-
tain idioms, like kicked the bucket, are expressions that behave as if they are
lexicalized (Swinney and Cutler, 1979; but see Holsinger and Kaiser, 2013)
or simply accessed in memory (McCabe, 1988; Caillies and Declarcq, 2011).
Meanwhile, others (e.g., Searle, 1979) have argued that obtaining the figurative
meaning of an expression requires one to first entertain its literal meaning to
later discard it, or that a figurative meaning can actually be obtained “directly”
(Gibbs, 2001; Glucksberg, 2003). These debates, however, will not be resolved
in the present paper.
Glucksberg and Haught, 2006). In addition, in the more specific
case of figurative expressions in AD, variables such as the degree
to which the patient must rely on executive functions such as
inhibition and abstraction (Laflache and Albert, 1995; Chapman
et al., 1997; Papagno et al., 2003), and whether or not the expres-
sion is “frozen,” i.e., stored as a whole (Amanzio et al., 2008;
Rassiga et al., 2009), have been investigated. We will take this
last variable as the perspective from which we discuss briefly the
studies on AD patients’ interpretation of figurative expressions.
The main reason for focusing on this variable is that “frozen”
and “non-frozen” expressions by hypothesis rely upon different
cognitive resources. In frozen expressions (e.g., idioms), the non-
literal meaning is fixed in the sense that the interpretation relies
more on the retrieval of a conventional meaning from semantic
memory than on the computation of a novel meaning. In con-
trast, non-frozen expressions, such as in most metaphors, actual
interpretation requires the computation of ameaning, rather than
retrieval from memory: even in the case of familiar and conven-
tional metaphors, the actual property retrieved from the vehicle
to predicate on the topic is flexible because numerous properties
are usually associated with a given conventional vehicle (e.g., ruth-
less, aggressive, sneaky, etc., for shark; see Roncero and de Almeida,
2014)4.
PROVERBS
A proverb often involves the “teaching of a lesson”—which
reflects its intended message. For example, Too many cooks spoil
the broth suggests that too many people involved in a single
project can spoil the end result. Although one could argue that
these expressions are compositional, for their literal meanings are
obtained from their constituents, proverbs are used to express
something else, perhaps analogous to the expression itself—and
thus they require the retrieval or the computation of another
message. Studies have shown that AD patients prefer literal (or
“concrete”) rather than figurative (“abstract”) interpretations of
proverbs (e.g., Rome wasn’t built in a day; Code and Lodge,
1987) and familiar, proverb-like sentences (e.g., He’s saving up
for a rainy day; Kempler et al., 1988). These results have been
obtained with both, free-interpretation (Code and Lodge, 1987)
and multiple choice tasks (Kempler et al., 1988), suggesting that
AD patients’ abstracting abilities might be impaired, making it
difficult for patients to go beyond what is explicitly said in the
sentence. However, Brundage (1996) found that the difficulty
with proverbs is mostly due to their familiarity, suggesting instead
that comprehension of proverbs relies more on remembering
an associated meaning, which becomes stronger with increased
familiarity, rather than relying on a process of abstraction from
the words in the proverbs. Consistent with these results, Laflache
and Albert (1995) found AD patients could provide accurate
proverb interpretations, despite showing impaired abstract think-
ing abilities. This effect was further confirmed by Chapman et al.
(1997), but only for familiar proverbs, with patients showing
an impairment for unfamiliar proverbs. Chapman et al. also
4Although we distinguish figurative expressions according the frozen/non-
frozen contrast, what is important is how the intended message conveyed by
these expressions is attained—whether it is stored or computed anew.
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found that when patients were given a multiple-choice task with
four alternatives, including “concrete” and “abstract” (i.e., figu-
rative) interpretations, the effect of familiarity disappeared, with
patients having difficulty selecting the figurative interpretation.
Therefore, the different conditions (multiple-choice vs. verbal
explanation) appear to have distinct cognitive demands, as AD
patients performed worse in the multiple-choice condition.
SARCASM
Sarcasm is a form of expression that usually stands in oppo-
sition to what is said: It is hot in here (Yukon, circa January)
means “it is cold” (or, more properly, its negation: “not hot”).
While the meaning of the expression itself is compositional, its
intended meaning needs to be inferred from a given intonation
or context. The investigation of sarcasm interpretation in AD
has also employed either free-interpretation (Kipps et al., 2009;
Rankin et al., 2009) or multiple-choice (Maki et al., 2012) tasks.
Both Kipps et al. (2009) and Rankin et al. (2009) employed two
subtests of the TASIT (The awareness of social interference test;
see McDonald et al., 2003) in which patients watched vignettes
with actors engaging in dialogs that could be interpreted as being
either sincere or sarcastic (e.g., Ruth: Great movie, wasn’t it? [. . . ]
Michael: [. . . ] I feel I could see it another dozen times). The dialogs
contained the same sentences, thus, participants had to rely on
extra-linguistic cues such as intonation, facial expressions, and
gestures to judge whether the actors in the scene were being sin-
cere or sarcastic. Both studies found no impoverished sarcasm
comprehension in AD patients compared to controls. In the study
by Maki et al. (2012), however, AD patients did perform sig-
nificantly worse than both, a group of healthy elderly controls
and a group of patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI):
in fact the AD patients chose the literal interpretation signifi-
cantly more than other control groups. As with proverbs, the
pattern of patients’ performance may be due to the task: the use of
a multiple-choice paradigm rather than interpretations through
verbal explanations.
IDIOMS
Idioms such as pushing up daisies (meaning “dead and buried”)
and hit the sack (“going to bed”), represent meanings that are
not compositional and might require retrieving the associated
meaning from memory. Studies investigating idioms in AD have
also found that performance in verbal descriptions is superior to
that in multiple-choice of picture selection tasks (Papagno et al.,
2003). However, Papagno et al. (2003) also showed that perfor-
mance in the picture selection task varies with the nature of the
pictures presented as alternatives. When patients are presented
with pictures representing literal and figurative interpretations
of common Italian proverbs (e.g., to have a green thumb), they
perform at chance (e.g., selecting either a picture of a man
with a thumb full of green paint or a picture of a woman gar-
dening), but when the alternative pictures represent either the
figurative meaning (the gardener) or an unrelated picture con-
taining the depiction of one word referent from the idiom (e.g.,
someone with a thumb stuck at a drawer), patients select the
figurative interpretation significantly more than the alternative.
These results suggest that AD patients are capable of interpreting
figurative expressions, but have difficulty efficiently suppressing
the literal interpretation when it is presented as an alternative
(Papagno et al., 2003).
The hypothesis that AD patients have difficulty suppressing
a literal interpretation was further investigated in two match-
ing tasks by Rassiga et al. (2009). In the first, patients had
to choose among four drawings the one that corresponded to
the interpretation of the idiom. In the second, patients had to
match the idiom to one of four alternative words, one asso-
ciated with the figurative interpretation, one associated with a
word in the idiom (the literal alternative), and two unrelated
words. Performance was worse than controls in both conditions.
In the picture-matching task, participants chose more often the
picture corresponding to the literal than to the figurative inter-
pretation. In the sentence-to-word task, however, patients chose
the word representing the figurative meaning of the idiom sig-
nificantly more than other alternatives. Rassiga et al. found that
performance on the sentence-to-word task was predicted only
by executive-function scores, as measured by a dual-task that
included digit span and paper-and-pencil maze tasks (Baddeley
et al., 1997). These results again suggest that difficulty in idiom
interpretation might be due to failure of inhibition of the lit-
eral interpretation, while the degree of inhibition needed can be
affected by test modality: picture matching requires more inhi-
bition than single-word matching possibly because alternative
scenes involve more working-memory resources to match to an
appropriate sentence. By extension, verbal explanations would
have required even less inhibition as they do not involve foils,
although Rassiga et al. (2009) did not employ this technique.
Indeed, in studies in which AD patients were asked to provide
verbal explanations for idioms (Papagno, 2001; Amanzio et al.,
2008), no impairment was found.
METAPHORS
Copular metaphors, in contrast to idioms, require identifying the
relevant property associated with the vehicle that can be applied
to the topic (Ortony, 1979; de Almeida et al., 2010). Thus, in
Juliet is the sun one needs to search for possible ways in which
the topic (Juliet) could be predicated by the vehicle (sun). As sug-
gested by Papagno (2001, p. 1458), metaphors involve “an active
search of the specific semantic attribute,”more so than other types
of figurative language. Because AD patients have impaired exec-
utive functions (Baddeley et al., 1986), it follows that metaphors’
increased cognitive demandsmay cause interpretation difficulties,
in particular in the search for an appropriate intended meaning.
In what was perhaps the first study examining metaphor inter-
pretation in AD,Winner and Gardner (1977) asked seven individ-
uals (all diagnosed with pre-senile dementia and probable AD) to
select, among four pictures, the one that best matched a given
metaphorical statement (e.g., a heavy heart can really make a dif-
ference). Two of the picture-types used are relevant to the present
paper: one that matched the figurative meaning of the metaphor
(a picture of a man crying), and a second one, which displayed
the literal form (a person having difficulty walking due to carry-
ing a large red heart). AD patients were found to pick the picture
representing the metaphorical meaning as many times as the pic-
ture representing the literal meaning (45 and 44% respectively).
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This result is consistent with those found for proverbs, idioms,
and sarcasm, which show that AD patients have difficulty
selecting the intended meaning in the presence of a literal
competitor 5.
Papagno (2001), however, employed a verbal explanations task
to examine AD patients’ comprehension of idioms andmetaphors
over a 6-month period. Both the idioms andmetaphors were con-
sidered highly familiar in Italian, to the extent that their meanings
could be found in a dictionary. The assumption was that AD
patients should have known these expressions, but could have
“lost” them during the disease progression. At first examination,
only four patients demonstrated impairment for nonliteral lan-
guage, with metaphor comprehension being the least impaired
linguistic ability. Among the errors produced, however, a distinc-
tion did emerge between idioms and metaphors. Whereas the
most common error for idioms was a literal interpretation, the
most common error for metaphors was an inability to produce
a response. When AD patients were retested at a later stage, there
was an overall decrease in nonliteral language comprehension, yet
further analysis showed this result was attributable to metaphors
only. AD patients showed no decrement for idioms. These results
led Papagno to suggest that language impairment, especially for
figurative language, is not an early symptom of AD and may only
occur late into the progression of the disease.
In addition to using verbal explanations rather than a match-
ing paradigm, Papagno’s (2001) study contrasts with Winner and
Gardner’s (1977) for the familiarity of the items used. Winner
and Gardner (1977) did not report the familiarity level of their
items, whereas Papagno’s metaphors were chosen for their high
familiarity. It is possible that the distinct results in the two stud-
ies reflect the familiarity level of the individual items in the
study. In other words, comprehension was better in Papagno’s
study because the metaphors were more familiar than those used
by Winner and Gardner. This hypothesis was investigated by
Amanzio et al. (2008), who compared AD patients’ interpre-
tation of novel metaphors with conventional ones—the same
conventional metaphors used by Papagno (2001).
Amanzio et al. (2008) predicted that AD patients would show
good interpretation for conventional metaphors, whose mean-
ings are well known, because patients would simply need to
retrieve the associated figurative meaning from memory, as done
for idioms. In contrast, AD patients would have more difficulty
with novel metaphors, whose figurative interpretation must be
constructed based on possible relationships between topics and
vehicles. Thus, the assumption was that for novel metaphors there
were no figurative meanings stored in memory. To further sup-
port this retrieval-construction dichotomy, Amanzio et al. also
compared participants’ ability to interpret new and conventional
metaphors to patients’ interpretations for idioms as these are also
assumed to simply rely on memory retrieval. Thus, patients and
controls were predicted to show similar performance for idioms
and conventional metaphors that rely on retrieval, but worse
5We also note that Maki et al. (2012) reported worse interpretation for con-
ventional Japanese metaphors (single-word and copular). We would argue,
however, that their use of a multiple-choice task could have again biased
patients to select the literal foil.
interpretation for novel metaphors whose meaning needs to be
constructed. The results supported their predictions. In addi-
tion to conventional metaphors, AD patients also showed good
interpretation (similar to controls) for idioms. Novel metaphors
were the only category where AD patients displayed a relative
impairment compared to controls. AD patients’ performance in
verbal, visual reasoning, and executive-function tasks were also
the best predictors of metaphor interpretation scores. Amanzio
et al. took these results to support their hypothesis that the main
obstacle faced by individuals when interpreting novel metaphors
is the need to construct a meaning due to impaired execu-
tive functions: “if the central executive is damaged, the ability
to create a new resemblance, required to understand a novel
metaphor, may be defective” (p. 7). When the comprehension
process relies on retrieval rather than construction, AD patients’
verbal explanations is similar to controls’, as observed for idioms
and conventional metaphors. However, when the process relies
on construction, comprehension can be impaired, as observed for
novel metaphors.
STUDY 1: THE COMPREHENSION OF METAPHORS IN
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
We set out to study metaphor comprehension in AD with three
main goals in mind. First we were interested in understand-
ing how the possible breakdown of metaphor comprehension
in this population might inform us about the normal processes
involved in metaphor processing. We see the investigation of pat-
terns of impaired performance—both in groups of patients and
in single-case studies—as an important method for understand-
ing how unimpaired linguistic and cognitive systems work (see
Caramazza, 1986; Zurif et al., 1989). Clearly, the contrast between
meaning construction and meaning retrieval suggested by stud-
ies on figurative language with AD patients implies that different
cognitive mechanisms might be recruited in metaphor compre-
hension, and that empirical results depend on task and stimulus
variables. Thus, a second goal in our study was to explore the
role of different variables underlying metaphor comprehension
and particularly the role of familiarity and aptness. And finally,
our third goal was to understand figurative language compre-
hension in AD proper, and more specifically how the semantic
and pragmatic systems might breakdown with the disease. The
paucity of metaphor comprehension studies in AD is surprising
given how productive these expressions are in natural language.
An exploration of how metaphors are understood can ultimately
help us understand how linguistic, semantic memory and work-
ing memory systems are affected with the progression of the
disease.
FAMILIARITY AND APTNESS
As we have seen in our brief review of the literature on fig-
urative language in AD, comprehension is better for what we
referred to as “frozen” than for “non-frozen” expressions—and
this difference reflects distinct cognitive demands.Whereas frozen
expressions require retrieving an associated meaning, non-frozen
expressions, such as most copular metaphors, require construct-
ing a meaning based on the relation between topic and vehicle
words. Whether or not good performance is observed, however,
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is related to two additional factors: task modality and familiar-
ity. Patients typically perform better when asked to provide verbal
explanations rather than when they are asked to match an expres-
sion to a picture, word, or sentence alternative; and they also
perform better when expressions are familiar. Familiarity, how-
ever, interacts with other ways of conceiving how one attains the
meaning of a figurative expression. One of them is what Giora
(1997) called saliency. She argues that both the literal and figura-
tive meanings, when available, compete during comprehension,
but the meaning with the highest level of saliency will be cho-
sen. Saliency, then is akin to the activation level that one meaning
will reach, winning out against a competitor, regardless whether
the winner is a literal or a figurative interpretation. With regards
to a particular figurative expression, then, the greater the famil-
iarity, the more strongly that expression will be associated with
a nonliteral meaning. In other words, familiarity has the effect
of making the nonliteral meaning more salient, which makes
subsequent retrieval of those meanings easier. Supporting this
argument, studies with healthy adults found that familiar nonlit-
eral expressions are read faster than less familiar ones (e.g., Blasko
and Brihl, 1997).
The impact of familiarity on saliency, then, is somewhat
straightforward: increased experience leads to stronger traces in
semantic memory. Gentner and Bowdle (2008), for example,
argue that vehicles initially have only an associated literal mean-
ing, but can gain an additional meaning from its frequent use with
different topics. Over time, exposure to the nonliteral use of the
vehicle leads it to become stored in semantic memory and thus
retrieved whenever the vehicle is heard or read in a statement. A
metaphor such as That film was a blockbuster is taken to mean
that the film had great commercial success, as opposed to mean
that the film exploded a city block. Gentner and Bowdle refer to
such vehicles as conventional. In the case of dead metaphors, vehi-
cles have become so conventional that only a nonliteral meaning
remains. It is worth noting that these highly conventional vehicles
were the types used by Papagno (2001) and Amanzio et al. (2008).
They found that AD patients interpreted conventional metaphors
as well as healthy controls, but were worse than controls when
asked to interpret novel metaphors.
In contrast to familiarity, aptness is not related to one’s experi-
ence but it is rather more related to the salient properties activated
by the expressions’ topic and vehicle. More specifically, aptness
is seen as reflecting the degree to which the vehicle term cap-
tures salient properties of the topic (McCabe, 1983; Chiappe et al.,
2003b); thus, an expression is more apt when the vehicle cap-
tures many properties of the topic. For example, the word rail
is not a conventional vehicle (Jones and Estes, 2006) and lacks a
strongly associated nonliteral meaning. Thus, the statement John
is a rail has no clear meaning other than the anomalous literal
one. Pairing the vehicle with the topic fashion model, however,
to state That fashion model is a rail conveys that the person is
extremely thin and skinny—like a rail. Here, the expression is
interpretable not from experience with the vehicle, but rather
because the statement is highly apt: the vehicle rail captures salient
attributes associated with fashion model (i.e., thinness).
Aptness has been found to correlate strongly with ease of
comprehension (Chiappe et al., 2003a). Some researchers (e.g.,
Glucksberg, 2003, 2008) even argue that aptness is a more
important variable than familiarity for metaphor comprehen-
sion because unfamiliar metaphors can be well understood if
the statements are sufficiently apt (e.g., Glucksberg and Haught,
2006). For AD patients, aptness couldmake comprehension easier
because the relevant properties are salient for both the topic and
the vehicle. Patients would then be biased toward selecting those
properties as the ones needed for interpretation because they have
the highest saliency level. For this reason, statements such as The
senator is a fossil are more apt and easier to understand than The
track star is a fossil. Although fossil in both cases has the relevant
attribute of old, this attribute is more salient of senators than track
stars, whichmakes it easier to employ the relevant attribute (Jones
and Estes, 2005, 2006).
In summary, it can be argued that both familiarity and aptness
are variables that might account for better metaphor comprehen-
sion. It has been difficult, however, to determine which of these
variables—aptness or familiarity—is more important because
several studies report significant positive correlations between
participants’ aptness and familiarity ratings (e.g., Jones and Estes,
2006; Thibodeau and Durgin, 2011). Such results have cast doubt
on studies that have relied on subjective ratings of familiarity from
participants because these ratings may have actually reflected the
items’ aptness level (Jones and Estes, 2005). To remedy this prob-
lem in the present study, we used instead an objective measure
of familiarity in our analysis: Internet frequency counts, gathered
using the guidelines from Roncero et al. (2006). These counts
were first used to reduce an initial large cohort of metaphors to
those used in the present study. For aptness judgments, we col-
lected norms from a large group of older adults. By using two
different types of measurements (subjective ratings for aptness,
but objective ratings for familiarity), we aimed at better tapping
into these distinct variables for metaphors whose meanings were
absent from a dictionary.
OTHER COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC VARIABLES
In addition to examining how different levels of familiarity
and aptness impact metaphor interpretation, we also examined
whether a participant’s ability to infer a relationship between
two objects would predict their ability to interpret metaphors.
Recall that constructing the meaning of a metaphor (e.g., time
is money) often involves understanding the relationship between
two terms (e.g., time-money). The vehicle (money) is under-
stood to predicate something about the topic (time), and inter-
pretation requires understanding what properties about time
are being made salient by money (e.g., that time is valuable).
Therefore, we were especially interested in scores obtained in
the Similarities subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS-IV). In this task, participants are asked how two objects
are “alike” (e.g., horse-tiger, food-gasoline) with different scores
allocated based on the quality of the answer provided. This
score is a good measure of a participant’s ability to create new
relations between two objects, and numerous studies have used
it to assess AD patients’ executive functions and in particular
abstracting abilities (e.g., Laflache and Albert, 1995; Chapman
et al., 1997; Helmes and Ostbye, 2002). Our prediction was
that the best interpretations would be produced by patients who
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demonstrate the greatest ability to list salient similarities between
two objects.
We also examined working memory as measured by the digit
span task (also a subtest of WAIS-IV). Because constructing the
meaning of a metaphor presumably requires being able to hold
both the topic and vehicle terms in working memory, participants
with an extremely short digit span could have difficulty holding
the topic term in working memory once the vehicle term itself
is processed. Consequently, participants with a very limited digit
span would be expected to display poor metaphor interpretation
abilities. Finally, we examined if the form of the expression would
impact interpretation. More specifically, we tested whether or not
participants would have less difficulty interpreting a metaphor
such as The mall is a zoo if it was presented as a simile (The mall
is like a zoo). Career of Metaphor theory (Bowdle and Gentner,
2005; Gentner and Bowdle, 2008) proposes that the comprehen-
sion of a novel metaphor involves a comparison process between
topic and vehicle (e.g., teachers-sculptors). More specifically, to
understand a new metaphor such as Teachers are sculptors, the
metaphor must be understood as a simile via the form Teachers
are like sculptors. If this is the case, when AD patients are pre-
sented with a novel metaphor, they might attempt to mentally
transform it into a simile to compare topic and vehicle. However,
a central executive impairment (Baddeley et al., 2001; Amanzio
et al., 2008) might hinder the ability to perform such a metaphor-
to-simile conversion. In order to test this hypothesis we asked
participants to interpret both metaphors and comparable similes,
which enabled us to determine if interpretation was better when
the metaphors were presented directly as similes.
In summary, in order to control for the possibility that our
familiarity ratings would reflect the item’s aptness rather than its
general frequency, we collected Internet frequency counts as an
objective measure of the items familiarity. We predicted that apt
metaphors would be better understood, regardless their familiar-
ity level, but this effect would interact with participants’ abstrac-
tion ability. More specifically, our prediction was that patients
with higher similarity scores would produce better interpreta-
tions. Lastly, we examined whether AD patients would under-
stand the relationship between topic and vehicle better when these
were presented as similes rather than metaphors.
METHODS
Participants
Eleven patients with probable AD (age range 55–86), diagnosed
with mild-to-moderate cognitive impairment were recruited
with assistance from the Alzheimer’s Society of Montreal, as
well as Sunrise of Beaconsfield, a retirement community in
Beaconsfield, Quebec. Participants were referred to us as indi-
viduals who had been given a diagnosis of AD according to
the criteria specified by the National Institute of Neurological
and Communicative Disorders and Stroke-Alzheimer’s Disease
and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS-ADRDA; McKhann
et al., 1984), and had no other diagnosed dementia or pathol-
ogy. We also examined patient files to verify the diagnosis. The
study was fully explained to each participant and they gave writ-
ten informed consent to participate in the study (the protocol
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Douglas
Mental Health University Institute). MoCA (Montreal Cognitive
Assessment; Nasreddine et al., 2005) and MMSE (Mini-Mental
State Examination; Folstein et al., 1975) were administered to all
AD patients. Further criteria for participating in the study was
patients’ ability to understand and follow commands, and have an
MMSE score of at least 16. Demographic and neuropsychological
data for all participants appear in Table 1.
Ten healthy elderly controls, with an age range of 63–86, were
recruited from Sunrise of Beaconsfield, were caregivers of the par-
ticipants diagnosed with AD, or were recruited from the general
public. For controls, only the MoCA was administered, with the
requirement that all controls obtain a score above 25. All partici-
pants (AD patients and controls) were native speakers of English,
or were bilinguals with a fluent command of English (case of two
individuals), having attended university in English and worked
professionally their entire lives in English. Therefore, these partic-
ipants’ English proficiency level was considered sufficient for the
present study. All participants had a minimum education level of
6 years (Table 1).
Table 1 | Demographic and neuropsychology data for AD patients and
normal controls.
Participant Age Education MoCA MMSE Digit Similarities
(years) span
AD1 84 17 19 26 10 13
AD2 68 14 21 29 14 29
AD3 82 15 26 29 14 29
AD4 55 15 14 16 8 21
AD5 71 14 16 23 10 23
AD6 83 17 22 30 12 21
AD7 84 21 17 26 13 11
AD8 76 13 14 21 13 0
AD9 86 11 16 18 13 19
AD10 81 11 13 24 8 23
AD11 71 12 04 16 8 0
Mean 76.5 14.5 16.6 23.5 11.2 17.2
(SD) (9.44) (2.98) (5.73) (5.15) (2.44) (10.13)
NC1 63 16 28 12 23
NC2 76 15 26 12 27
NC3 65 18 29 13 25
NC4 73 12 28 10 26
NC5 65 15 27 12 29
NC6 86 16 29 11 28
NC7 75 15 29 13 25
NC8 69 15 28 12 28
NC9 70 06 28 11 26
NC10 81 14 28 10 25
Mean 72.3 14.2 28 11.6 26.2
(SD) (7.41) (3.25) (0.94) (1.07) (1.81)
AD, Alzheimer’s Disease; NC, Normal Controls; MoCA, Montreal Cognitive
Assessment (Nasreddine et al., 2005); MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination
(Folstein et al., 1975); Digit Span and Similarities, Subtests of the WAIS-IV; SD,
Standard Deviation.
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Materials
The preparation of the stimuli involved two main phases. The
first included an aptness-rating task, with a group of healthy
elderly individuals, and the collection of frequency counts from
the Internet, using the Google Search Engine (see below). These
frequency counts allowed us to first identify those metaphors
that were familiar and those that were unfamiliar. In the second
phase, interpretation norms for a subset of metaphors from the
first phase were obtained with another group of healthy elderly
individuals. We also collected frequency counts from the Corpus
of Contemporary American English (COCA; Davies, 2009) for
the metaphors presented to participants. These COCA scores
allowed us to check that the Internet counts for the metaphors do
accurately reflect general frequency and served as a second objec-
tive rating of familiarity. Aptness, familiarity, and interpretation
norms for the materials employed in the present study appear in
the Supplementary Material.
Aptness. Twenty healthy elderly controls (age range 60–83; 10
females), all native speakers of English, were recruited from the
general public and given monetary compensation for complet-
ing a rating task. These participants did not take part in the
subsequent metaphor interpretation task. They were presented a
booklet containing 84 metaphors (e.g., Trees are umbrellas) taken
from another study (Roncero and de Almeida, 2014). Below each
expression, there was a scale ranging from 1 to 7. Participants were
asked to rate how apt they found each metaphor, where 1 was
labeled not apt, 4 asmoderately apt, and 7 as very apt. Aptness was
explained as how valid they thought each statement was. Politics is
a junglewas given as an example of an apt statement, while Politics
is a beach was given as an example of a less apt statement.
Familiarity. The Google search engine was used to collect
Internet frequency counts following the guidelines set by Roncero
et al. (2006). In this method, a metaphor (e.g.,Music is medicine)
is written within quotation marks into the search box to pro-
duce a list of websites where the searched item was found. The
first website listed is examined, and in general, if the metaphor is
used in a figurative manner and expressing the meaning of the
searched metaphor, then its production is included in the fre-
quency counts. The next website listed is then examined, and
so on, until a cut-off point of 30 “hits” is reached. To be clear,
more than simply the first 30 websites are examined. Websites
are examined one-by-one until a maximum of 30 productions
that properly express the meaning of the searched metaphor is
found. Furthermore, repetitions of the same metaphor within a
website (e.g., when posts quote the same sentence repeatedly),
and repetitions of the same title for a song or book across web-
sites, are counted only once within the total; consequently, this
method is more meticulous than simply examining the first 30
websites listed. Regarding the cut-off, the high number of websites
listed by Google for certain metaphors can be greater than 10,000
for less familiar metaphors such as Cities are jungles, or near
the millions for very familiar metaphors such as Time is money.
As a practical solution, Roncero et al. chose 30 after remarking
that few metaphors actually yield this number of productions.
Expressions that reach a familiarity score of 30 would also still
reflect a relatively higher level of familiarity compared to the rest
of the expressions.
Note that the number of hits that Google initially lists is sepa-
rate from the list of websites it lists. For example, although Google
may inform that there are 11,300 hits for the metaphor Cities are
jungles, the number of websites initially listed is only 99. After list-
ing these websites, Google will print the statement “in order to
show you the most relevant entries, we have omitted some entries
very similar.” This number varies per expression; for example,
while it is 99 results prior to the Google statement for Cities are
jungles, it is 243 for Lawyers are sharks, and the non-listed hits
come from the same websites that Google already listed. In the
present study, we checked all websites until a frequency count of
30 was reached or when Google printed the statement “in order to
show you the most relevant results...” for the searched metaphor.
Therefore, a frequency count for a metaphor based on the Google
search engine reflects how many distinct websites displayed a
spontaneous use of the expression.
To further ensure that these Internet frequency counts were
tapping into expression familiarity, we also collected COCA fre-
quency counts for the metaphors that were employed in the
interpretation task. However, for these frequencies a less restric-
tive set of guidelines was used, and no maximum cut-off points
were applied. The topic (e.g., time) was entered as the search
word and the vehicle (e.g., money) was entered as a collocation
within five words before or after the topic. Each listed production
was then checked for whether it was expressing a literal or figu-
rative interpretation. For example, He was run out of both time
and money would be considered a literal interpretation because it
refers to time and money in a concrete, non-figurative, manner.
In contrast, a sentence such as He didn’t understand that for his
lawyer time was money would be included because it reflects the
figurative meaning of time is money. We also included examples in
the overall count when the exact structure was different, but the
expressed meaning was the same. For example, while participants
in the present study interpreted Time is money, the COCA count
totals included productions such as Time was money, money is
equivalent to time, and In this profession, money and time are equiv-
alent. In summary, a given COCA example was excluded from the
count totals only when it expressed a literal interpretation of the
topic-vehicle relationship.
Selection of metaphors. Prior to the study, we decided to employ
a set of metaphors that varied in terms of aptness and familiar-
ity, and that only 20 expressions would be presented to each AD
patient because a larger number of items would conceivably cause
fatigue, due also to other pre-experimental tasks involved. We
identified 5 metaphors (or their equivalent similes) that were apt
but not familiar (aptness rating higher than 3.5, but an Internet
frequency count less than 15), and 5 metaphors that were nei-
ther apt nor familiar (an Internet frequency count less than 15,
and an aptness rating less than 3.5) There were no items with an
Internet frequency count greater than 15 that had an aptness rat-
ing less than 3.5; these metaphors would have been categorized
as familiar, but not apt. Therefore, to complete our cohort, we
identified 10 metaphors that were apt and familiar (an Internet
frequency count greater than 15 and an aptness rating higher
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than 3.5). However, as we later discuss, two of the apt and famil-
iar metaphors were ultimately removed from the analyses due to
difficulty in interpretation.
Interpretation norms. In order to collect interpretation norms—
i.e., to obtain the most common interpretation for each
expression—a booklet containing the 20 selected metaphors was
created. This booklet was presented to 20 healthy controls (age
range 60–84; 14 females) that had not participated in the ratings
norms nor served as controls in the subsequent interpretation
task. In this booklet, each metaphor was presented within a sen-
tence that asked participants to state which property was being
expressed about the topic (e.g., Education is a stairway because
education is. . . ). Thismethod helped facilitate answers that would
reflect a particular property or adjective. People were asked to
write their answers on a line placed beneath each expression.
The different properties expressed by each participant were
collapsed under a single property when they were considered
synonyms. For example, ruthless and aggressive for Lawyers are
sharks were grouped together under the property label ruthless,
while valuable and important for Time is money were both catego-
rized under the property important. Participants also sometimes
wrote elaborate sentences that had the similar meaning of a par-
ticular property, without necessarily using a synonym of that
particular property. For example, one participant wrote Lawyers
are sharks because lawyers are out to get you! This sentence was
categorized as expressing the property label ruthless for lawyers
are sharks because the sentence conveys the idea that lawyers
are ruthless.
Two judges were involved in coding the responses. The first
judge created the set of properties that reflected the interpreta-
tions written for each metaphor. The second judge then verified
whether the property chosen was appropriate for the interpreta-
tion given. The second judge consulted the first judge when there
were any disagreements and resolved any discrepancy. Once the
set of properties had been decided, any property stated by a min-
imum of three participants was considered a salient property for
that metaphor. Any properties stated by only two individuals were
considered less salient properties. Properties stated only once
were considered non-salient properties. This procedure allowed
us to identify salient properties for all of the metaphors, but cer-
tain metaphors lacked less salient properties as there were no
properties mentioned by at least two individuals. A list of the
metaphors sorted by item group, accompanied by their salient
and less salient properties, is presented in the Supplementary
Material.
Stimuli. Two booklets were created for the metaphor interpreta-
tion task. One booklet listed half the original metaphors as similes
(e.g., Cities are like jungles rather than Cities are jungles). In the
second booklet, the topic-vehicle pairs were in the same order,
but those items that were metaphors in booklet 1 were written as
similes in booklet 2, and vice-versa.
Procedure
A researcher first administered the MoCA and MMSE, if the par-
ticipant was a person diagnosed with AD, or only the MoCA if
the participant was an elderly control. In addition, two subtests
of the WAIS-IV were administered: similarities and the forward
digit span task. Afterwards—or at another session if the previ-
ous tasks took longer than an hour—each participant was read
either the first sentence of booklet 1 or 2 and asked to provide
an interpretation of the sentence. For example, the first time the
metaphor Music is medicine was read, the researcher asked the
participant,What is someone trying to say when he or she says that
music is medicine? If the participant could not provide an answer,
or failed to mention a particular property, the researcher then
asked the participant, If someone were to say that music is medicine,
what would they be trying to say about music? This method helped
prompt answers that reflected a particular property that could
then be matched to the interpretation norms. After an interpreta-
tion had been given by the participant, and transcribed by the
researcher, or if the participant was still unable to provide an
adequate answer, the next sentence was read, and so on, for all
20 items. Participants were given unlimited time to provide an
interpretation, and told it was fine if they could not think of
an interpretation. Sessions involving the metaphor interpretation
task lasted approximately 30min.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Interpretation scoring followed a procedure similar to that used
by Papagno (2001). A score of 2 was given if the interpretation
mentioned a salient property, but a score of 1 if the interpretation
mentioned a less-salient property. If the interpretation expressed
a meaning completely different from the salient or less salient
properties, or if the participant was unable to provide an answer,
a score of 0 was given. Therefore, the maximum average inter-
pretation score obtainable for a particular group was 2. In order
to score the answers, one researcher first allocated a set of scores
based on the transcriptions, while a second judge, who was blind
to whether the interpretations came from a control or a person
diagnosed with AD, also provided scores as a reliability check. The
interclass correlation was 0.85 (p < 0.001). Because this reliabil-
ity score was high, the scores from the first researcher were used
in all subsequent analyses.
As mentioned above, two items were dropped from analy-
sis because participants (AD patients and controls) repeatedly
expressed difficulty providing an interpretation. Several partic-
ipants expressed understanding the statement Life is a journey,
but stated it was difficult to put into words a particular meaning.
When interpretations were provided, most participants provided
elaborate discussions about life in general rather than provid-
ing a particular property. The metaphor Genes are blueprints also
caused confusion and was consequently dropped from analy-
sis. For most participants, there was an initial period where the
participant had to be told that the sentence meant genes “as in
DNA” as opposed to blue jeans. Several participants (especially
AD patients) expressed not understanding the concept DNA.
Therefore, the metaphor interpretation scores for these items
were not included in any of the analyses involving metaphor
interpretation scores.
Group analyses
For AD patients, the mean metaphor score was 1.21 (SD = 0.49)
and the mean simile score was 1.32 (SD = 0.19). For normal
elderly controls, the mean metaphor score was 1.45 (SD = 0.14),
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and the mean simile score was 1.55 (SD = 0.31). Figure 1 in
the supplementary materials displays these results. We first ran
a repeated-measures ANOVA that compared AD patients’ and
elderly controls’ general means for metaphor and simile interpre-
tation scores. Group (AD vs. Control) was the between-subject
factor and form (metaphor vs. simile) was the within-subject fac-
tor. The main effect of form was not significant [F(1, 19) = 1.47,
p = 0.24, ηp = 0.072], nor was the interaction [F(1, 19) = 0.01,
p = 0.95, ηp = 0.001]. These non-significant effects, in principle,
go against the hypothesis that topic-vehicle words presented in
metaphor form (x is y) would be harder to understand because
they would need to be converted into simile form (x is like y),
while similes allow for a direct comparison. Although the lack
of a difference cannot rule out this hypothesis—in particular
because it applies primarily to novel metaphors (e.g., Gentner
and Bowdle, 2008)—it is important to note that the verbal inter-
pretation task we employed requires a figurative interpretation of
the relation between topic and vehicle, and thus metaphor and
simile forms might yield the same interpretation strategy, with
both leading to a figurative interpretation. Due to this lack of dif-
ference, we refer to these expressions simply as metaphors. The
mean metaphor interpretation score for AD patients was 1.26
(SD = 0.29) vs. 1.50 (SD = 0.19) for normal controls, and this
difference was significant when we ran the repeated-measures
ANOVA [F(1, 19) = 4.82, p < 0.05; ηp = 0.20]. We also com-
pared this difference by items, and again found a significant
difference [t(17) = −2.17, p < 0.05, r = 0.47]. Thus, the differ-
ence between groups, regardless of expression type or other
stimulus variables (see below), suggests an impairment in fig-
urative language interpretation in AD, an effect that has not
been obtained in tasks that require overt explanation of figura-
tive meaning (e.g., Papagno, 2001; Amanzio et al., 2008). Recall,
however, that those null differences were found for conventional
metaphors only. We next examine how item variables influenced
interpretation.
Effects of aptness and familiarity
We first examined whether the COCA counts would correlate
with the Google counts in order to validate Internet frequencies as
predictors of familiarity. We found a positive correlation between
the Google search counts and the COCA counts [r(16) = 0.49,
p < 0.05], which suggests the Google counts collected using the
Roncero et al. (2006) method tap into how familiar participants
may be with a metaphorically expressed meaning. In order to bet-
ter understand the aptness and familiarity effects on metaphor
interpretation, we ran a multiple regression with the aptness rat-
ings, Internet frequency counts, and COCA counts as predictors
and AD patients’ interpretation scores as the dependent vari-
able. The overall model was significant [Adj R2 = 0.43, F(3, 14) =
5.34, p < 0.05]. Among the individual predictors, however, apt-
ness ratings alone were a significant predictor of interpretation
scores (t = 3.58, p < 0.01), but not the Internet frequency counts
(t = −0.23, p = 0.82) nor the COCA counts (t = −0.38, p =
0.71). See Figure 2 in the supplementary materials for a scat-
terplot between aptness ratings and AD patients’ interpretation
scores. Similar results were found for controls’ interpretation
scores. Again, the overall model was significant [Adj R2 = 0.43,
F(3, 14) = 5.27, p < 0.05], and aptness ratings were a significant
predictor (t = 3.58, p < 0.01), but not Internet frequency counts
(t = −0.09, p = 0.93), nor COCA counts (t = −1.06, p = 0.31).
Participant variables
The results are suggestive of a general aptness effect on metaphor
interpretation—with overall better interpretation when the rela-
tion between topic and vehicle is deemed apt rather than famil-
iar. However, other participant variables need to be taken into
account before we can generalize over the effect of aptness
on comprehension. In order to better understand the factors
influencing performance on the different metaphor factors, we
first compared participants’ working memory as measured by
the simple digit span task. No difference was found between
AD patients (M = 11.18; SD = 2.44) and controls [M = 11.60;
SD = 1.07; t(14.01) = 0.52, p = 0.61, r = 0.14]. AD patients had
a mean similarity judgment score of 17.18 (SD = 10.13), while
controls’ score was 26.20 (SD = 1.81). This difference was signif-
icant [t(10.70) = −2.90, p < 0.05, r = 0.66]. Finally, AD patients’
metaphor interpretation scores were found to correlate with sim-
ilarity judgment scores [r(9) = 0.68, p < 0.05], but not digit span
scores [r(9) = 0.06, p = 0.86]. Therefore, the ability to abstract
a relationship between two objects might be considered a strong
predictor of patients’ abilities to interpret metaphor.
STUDY 2: SUBJECTIVE FAMILIARITY RATINGS BY ELDERLY
INDIVIDUALS
In our main study, aptness ratings provided by participants were
strong predictors of metaphor comprehension. In contrast, two
objectives measures of familiarity, Internet counts and COCA fre-
quency counts, failed to predict which metaphors would be better
interpreted by AD patients. This result is surprising considering
studies (e.g., Amanzio et al., 2008) suggesting that familiarity is
a strong predictor for the correct interpretation of metaphors.
One crucial difference between our metaphors and those of
Amanzio et al., however, is that while they used conventional
metaphors (obtainable from the dictionary) as their set of famil-
iar and easily understandable metaphors, we used metaphors
whose meaning requires understanding a perceived relationship
between a topic-vehicle pair even when that metaphor is unfa-
miliar (e.g., Deserts are ovens). A valid concern, however, is that
our measures may have more properly reflected frequency rather
than familiarity per se. We assume that more frequent expres-
sions are also more familiar, but such measures only indirectly
reflect familiarity when personal experience itself is considered,
and may exist on a more subjective level entirely. For exam-
ple, one may only have heard a particular expression such as
Lawyers as sharks a few times (say, less than ten), but neverthe-
less consider the expression rather familiar. Our concern in the
first study is that such judgments are influenced by aptness. More
specifically, apt metaphors are more easily understood (Chiappe
et al., 2003a), and this ease of interpretation might lead people
to have the impression that these metaphors are actually more
familiar than they are (Thibodeau and Durgin, 2011; see also
Jacoby and Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea and Williams, 2001,
andWesterman, 2008 for parallels in visual recognitionmemory).
These concerns motivated our preference for objective measures
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 973 | 9
Roncero and de Almeida Metaphor comprehension in Alzheimer’s
of familiarity in the study on metaphor interpretation, but it may
have also come at the cost of only examining familiarity indirectly:
frequency (occurrence across a medium), rather than familiarity,
which would have predicted better interpretations.
In the present study, we examined the predictive value of sub-
jective familiarity ratings. A group of elderly adults was asked
to judge how familiar they found the expressions used in the
metaphor interpretation study. To ensure that participants would
not be biased by aptness—a central concern of our previous
study’s use of objective measures—participants were specifically
told to ignore all aspects related to the metaphor, except their
personal experience. We then examined if these subjective rat-
ings of familiarity would predict AD interpretation scores that
were collected in the previous study. Because our concern from
the beginning of the investigation has been the bias effect of
aptness on familiarity ratings, we predicted that there would be
a significant relationship between aptness and familiarity rat-
ings despite our best efforts to remove such bias. This result
reflects the ease of interpretation effect, whereby people con-
sider statements more familiar because they are more quickly
or easily interpreted. Furthermore, in case the subjective famil-
iarity ratings would be a significant predictor of interpreta-
tion scores, the aptness ratings collected in the previous study
would nevertheless be found to be the stronger predictor of
interpretation.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty elderly adults (age range: 67–88, 15 females) were
recruited from a list of participants at the Bloomfield Center
for Research in Aging (Lady Davis Institute, Jewish General
Hospital, Montreal). These participants are accustomed to being
recruited for various studies, have no known psychiatric ill-
ness nor signs of dementia, and all participants obtained scores
over 26 (normal range) on a MoCA task that was administered
before the metaphor familiarity task. On this occasion, partici-
pants were also administered a large battery of tasks for various
unrelated studies, which included the present familiarity ratings.
Participants were given monetary compensation for their time.
Familiarity ratings
Ratings were collected vocally. Participants were told they would
be read a series of metaphors, and they were to rate how often
they had heard the expression in the past, employing a scale rang-
ing from 1 (not at all) to 7 (practically every day). They were
further told that they were not to rate how well they liked the
expression, nor how well they understood it, but to focus solely
on how often they had heard this given expression previously.
Finally, they were told that while some expressions may be quite
familiar, others could be ones they had never heard before, case
in which they should simply answer honestly with a rating of 1.
After the participant confirmed understanding the instructions,
the researcher then read each metaphor in the following man-
ner: From 1 to 7, 1 being not at all, how often have you heard
the metaphor. . . (e.g. Music is medicine)? All participants were
read each expression in this manner one-by-one, and all par-
ticipants were presented the expressions in the same order. The
participant then stated a number between 1 and 7 as their rat-
ing, and the researcher recorded this response. If the participant
chose to change their rating before moving to the next expression,
this new rating replaced the first one. When participants gave two
responses (e.g., stating “I’d give that a 2 or a 3”), the lower number
was always chosen.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The collected familiarity ratings are presented in the
Supplementary Material. The mean metaphor rating was
3.45 (SD = 1.84). These ratings correlated significantly with both
the Internet counts [r(16) = 0.61, p < 0.01] as well as the COCA
counts [r(16) = 0.59, p < 0.01], which suggests that participants’
ratings were tapping into the general frequency of the expression.
However, as predicted, subjective familiarity ratings were also
significantly correlated with the aptness ratings obtained in the
previous study [r(16) = 0.70, p < 0.01], which suggests that
ratings were affected by an items’ aptness level. Indeed, the signif-
icant correlation with aptness may explain why these subjective
measures of familiarity, unlike the previously collected objective
measures, were a significant predictor for the interpretation
scores of AD patients from study 1 [r(16) = 0.53, p < 0.05].
Noting these three significant relationships (aptness and
familiarity, aptness with interpretation scores, familiarity with
interpretation scores), we checked for mediation by running a
regression with both aptness and familiarity ratings as predictors,
and AD patients’ interpretation scores as the dependent variable.
The overall model was significant [F(2, 15) = 8.26, p < 0.01], but
among the individual predictors, the only one significant was
aptness (t = 2.78, p < 0.05; familiarity, t = 0.16, p = 0.88).
The results thus allow us to argue that AD patients’ superior
interpretation of metaphors rated more familiar is fully mediated
by the aptness level of these metaphors. Furthermore, the semi-
partial correlation between AD patients’ interpretation scores and
aptness ratings was 0.50, but only 0.03 for familiarity ratings;
a large drop from 0.53 when familiarity ratings are considered
alone. Therefore, the results cement our findings from the pre-
vious study: when considering the types of metaphors that will be
best interpreted by AD patients, aptness rather than familiarity
is a more important predictor. Metaphors that older adults con-
sider more familiar will be better interpreted by AD patients, but
this relationship depends on the aptness level of these metaphors.
In other words, metaphors considered more familiar are bet-
ter understood by AD patients because they are also inherently
more apt.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Thus far, only studies employing a multiple choice or a match-to-
target kind of test have found deterioration in figurative language
comprehension in mild-to-moderate AD patients (e.g., Chapman
et al., 1997; Rassiga et al., 2009). A similar pattern was also
obtained by two of the other four studies investigating metaphor
comprehension in AD (Winner and Gardner, 1977; Maki et al.,
2012). One problem with such studies is that the task provides a
literal interpretation together with the figurative one; in those cir-
cumstances, AD patients may have difficulty inhibiting the literal
interpretation in order to select the figurative one. When tasks
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require free verbal interpretations of familiar figurative language,
AD patients usually do not differ from controls (e.g., Papagno,
2001; Amanzio et al., 2008). In the present study, participants
were asked to provide interpretations for different metaphors
and similes, and while metaphors and similes did not differ
within groups, AD patients produced overall worse figurative
interpretations than did controls. Crucially, however, we also
show that the pattern of impairment in AD depends both on the
patient’s abstraction abilities and on the aptness of the metaphor.
In this section we focus on two key issues related to the pat-
tern of figurative language performance in AD: stimulus variables,
in particular aptness and familiarity, and whether the meaning
of a figurative expression is constructed or stored in memory.
We follow this discussion with a proposal for how aptness and
abstraction abilities interact to yield metaphor interpretation.
APTNESS AND FAMILIARITY
Familiarity with a figurative expression has been one of the most
studied variables investigated in both, the psycholinguistics and
the cognitive neuropsychology literatures (see Gibbs, 2008; Rapp
and Wild, 2011). The studies by Papagno (2001) and Amanzio
et al. (2008), more specifically, had both employed familiar (dic-
tionary listed) metaphors; and in both studies, patients had
no difficulty with familiar metaphors, on the assumption that
their meanings could be accessed from memory. Amanzio et al.
showed moreover that the patients had greater difficulty inter-
preting novel metaphors—on the assumption that they would
need to compute a novel meaning and this ability might be
affected in AD. From these results, Amanzio et al. argued that
novelty was a crucial variable for predicting performance. In the
present study, we showed the importance of aptness for predicting
metaphor interpretation. Patients’ interpretations, despite being
worse than the controls’, were particularly affected by item vari-
ables. Furthermore, when we examined aptness and familiarity as
predictors of interpretation scores, the pattern of results point to
aptness playing a bigger role than familiarity formetaphors whose
meanings require the computation of a relationship between the
topic and vehicle. Finally, even when we did find a significant rela-
tionship between subjective ratings of familiarity and metaphor
interpretation, this relationship was found to be fully mediated
by aptness. Therefore, a familiar metaphor is understood well
because it is apt.
In the world of music, a cliché question is whether a song is
popular because it is good, or good because it is popular. This
question has an analogous one within the world of metaphor:
is a metaphor apt because it is familiar, or familiar because it is
apt? (Thibodeau and Durgin, 2011). In the present study, we were
unable to identify a familiar metaphor that was not considered
apt, despite working initially with a cohort of 84 metaphors (see
Roncero and de Almeida, 2014, for the full set and norms). In
contrast, it was possible to find metaphors considered apt but not
familiar. We believe this reflects a tendency, perhaps a necessity,
for expressions to be apt before they are familiar because aptness
more so than familiarity will breed comprehensibility. Indeed,
consider an extremely inapt statement such as Flags are dust.
One could recite this metaphor ad nauseum and probably never
compose a meaning other than the seemingly anomalous literal
one. Thus, some level of aptness is needed to give metaphors a
comprehensible “lift-off” (Chiappe et al., 2003b; Roncero et al.,
2006). Consistent with this idea, we found that the relation-
ship between subjective (i.e., rated) familiarity and interpretation
ability was fully mediated by aptness in the study on metaphor
interpretation. Note also that while Amanzio et al. (2008) stressed
the importance of item familiarity for predicting AD patients’
interpretation of metaphors, the metaphors they used were also
highly apt. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the AD patients in
that study had significantly lower or similar abstraction abilities
than the control participants, which we have found to be a key
predictive variable for AD patients’ interpretation of metaphors.
The results also remind us of a basic characteristic of language:
comprehension is possible for statements that have never been
heard before because language is compositional and systematic,
and thus productive. Novel expressions (or novel combinations
of familiar words) such as metaphors are understood because
they hinge on our ability to compose meanings and thus evaluate
the relationship between the expressions’ constituents even when
they are not familiar. Consider, for example, the metaphorDeserts
are ovens. Participants consistently stated they had rarely to never
heard this expression before, an expression that had low COCA
and Internet counts, but one which AD patients and normal par-
ticipants almost always correctly stated its metaphorical meaning.
Familiarity is probably more important for opaque relationships,
i.e., those that are not deducible from the words in the expres-
sion as is the case of idioms where the meaning of the expression
and its constituent lexical items seem to share an arbitrary rela-
tionship. In contrast, in a metaphor where the vehicle used is
often selected to express a particular relationship (e.g., Juliet is the
sun), the aptness of the expression and the abstraction abilities
of the individual can be expected to play a greater role in deter-
mining how easily it is interpreted correctly. In summary, while
familiarity plays a role in metaphor comprehension, as shown
in previous studies, the aptness of a metaphor seems to play yet
a greater role.
ABSTRACTION, RETRIEVAL, AND CONSTRUCTION
These variables cut across another key distinction in how the
meaning of a metaphor is attained: whether it is by accessing
a stored representation in memory or whether it is constructed
online. As our data suggest, being able to take advantage of the
qualities related to aptness depends on the extent to which the
ability to abstract is preserved. If so, patients with more impaired
abstraction abilities can be expected to demonstrate more dif-
ficulty constructing interpretations for metaphors. If the level
of abstraction required is low, however, it is possible that even
patients with more impaired abstraction abilities can demon-
strate normal levels of comprehension. For example, it is easier to
determine the relationship between carrots and broccoli (both are
vegetables) than betweenmusic and tides (both have rhythms). In
our data, we noticed that among the best-interpreted metaphors
by AD patients was Deserts are ovens, where the salient prop-
erty was hot; and also a majority of the AD patients correctly
interpreted the metaphor Hair is a rainbow as meaning hair is
colorful. However, neither of these metaphors had been rated
apt, and both had low Internet frequency counts (n < 5). These
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findings support the argument that metaphors can be easily inter-
preted, despite not being very apt, when the abstraction level
demanded is low, and perhaps especially true when the proper-
ties needed for interpretation are concrete and sensory in nature
(Aisenman, 1999). In contrast, a metaphor such as Families are
fortresses, which would be more difficult for people with low
abstraction ability, makes no reference to a specific literal property
of fortresses (e.g., made of stone), and refers to more abstract
concepts of security and protection. These observations sup-
port one of our main suggestions: insofar as different metaphors
require constructing meanings that reflect different abstraction
levels, individuals who are better abstractors should have an eas-
ier time interpretingmetaphors. Although this suggestion is made
within the limited scope of our investigation with Alzheimer’s
patients, it points to an important aspect of metaphor—and fig-
urative language—interpretation in general: the ability to infer
intended messages from the often anomalous linguistic expres-
sions requires a computational mechanism capable of generating
properties and relations beyond linguistic denotation. We suggest
that this mechanism is intrinsically associated with comprehen-
ders’ abstracting capacities.
The pattern of our results then supports the idea that abstrac-
tion plays a key role in building figurative representations, with
the aptness of an expression being the most important stimulus
property.Whereas Amanzio et al. (2008) argued that novelty mat-
ters, we would argue that aptness matters more. Statements are
familiar because they are apt, and unfamiliar statements should be
understood by AD patients when the aptness level is sufficiently
high. Also, while it is difficult to compare our study to that by
Amanzio et al.’s, given the numerous methodological differences
(language, materials, task, and participant variables), a critical
issue seems to be the metaphors used in both studies. Amanzio
et al. employed conventional Italian metaphors whose meanings
were retrievable from the dictionary, and often included topics
that were simply proper names (e.g., Marco is a lion). Metaphors
that use proper names as topics only require selecting a property
of the vehicle; and this process is more consistent with the need
to simply retrieve an associated property (perhaps a typical prop-
erty of lions) to use in the predication. In contrast, the familiar
metaphors used in the present study never used topics that were
proper names; thus, even for familiar metaphors, patients needed
to construct a particular relationship between the topic and vehi-
cle to attain an interpretation. With regards to the computations
required for interpretation, then, our set of metaphors could be
taken as similar to the novel metaphors used by Amanzio et al.:
rather than being retrieved from memory, their meanings had to
be constructed, based on the properties triggered by the vehicle
that could be predicated of the topic. This process can be expected
to be easier for all participants when the statements are apt.
Finally, these results also reinforce a key contrast between
(“unfrozen”) metaphors and other (“frozen”) figurative language
types. Whereas patients can rely more on retrieval processes for
familiar expressions that have a specific associatedmeaning, many
common metaphors require patients to deploy abilities that allow
them to construct an appropriate interpretation. As we have seen,
most studies on proverbs, idioms, sarcasm, and metaphor sug-
gest that AD patients’ primary difficulty with figurative language
seems to be the ability to inhibit a literal interpretation when
it is available (e.g., in multiple-choice tasks). But when there is
no competition from a literal interpretation and when expres-
sions are familiar, AD patients often did not differ significantly
from healthy controls. For less familiar expressions, however, AD
patients had shown a reduced ability compared to controls, sug-
gesting an impaired ability to build new meanings. The present
study found, however, that the ability to build new meanings is
associated to the capacity to abstract away from literal meaning
(compute related predicates) and the aptness of the expression.
INTERPRETING METAPHORS IN ALZHEIMER’S
While we have shown evidence for the role of both, abstraction
as a participant variable and aptness as a stimulus variable, in
metaphor comprehension, it is not clear yet how the two interact
to yield a successful interpretation. As measured by the WAIS-IV
similarities subtest, abstraction is a process required to go beyond
word meanings in search of properties that can account for how
two referents might be related. While any two referents can be
related (e.g., two things that are concrete or co-exist on Earth),
finding appropriate relations requires an examination of which
properties P can be predicated of any two given objects x and y
such that P(x) and P(y) can be deemed true. Aptness is the vari-
able that facilitates this process in metaphor comprehension. An
apt metaphor is one in which sets of properties about the vehicle
can be attributed to the salient properties of the topic. The pro-
cess of finding which properties of the vehicle can be predicated
about the topic, relies on accessing sets of predicates in mem-
ory (e.g., [ruthless[shark]], [carnivore[shark]) or building them
anew ([sneaky[shark]]) and applying them to the topic ([ruth-
less[lawyer]], [sneaky[lawyer]]) to yield an interpretation of the
metaphor. Furthermore, this process can interact with the pro-
gression of AD. Over the course of the disease, as semantic mem-
ory deteriorates progressively (Chertkow and Bub, 1990; Mårdh
et al., 2013) less familiar information is expected to be “lost”
first (Laisney et al., 2011) and semantic categories are expected
to become increasingly prototypical over time (Chertkow and
Bub, 1990; Laisney et al., 2011; Mårdh et al., 2013). Therefore,
metaphors whose interpretations rely on less salient properties of
topic-vehicle relations can be expected to engender greater dif-
ficulty. Apt metaphors, in contrast, often rely on vehicles whose
properties can be easily predicated to the topic (Glucksberg,
2003; Jones and Estes, 2006) and may remain comprehensible for
AD patients because their properties might still be available in
semantic memory.
We would thus argue that patients who are better abstrac-
tors (i.e., closer to or at normal abstraction ability) can interpret
even unfamiliar metaphors when these are apt. We suggest that
they are capable of doing so because they can compute not only
the literal meanings of words but also search for the vehicle
predicates that make a predication about the topic appropriate.
It is also worth noting that the interpretation errors made by
AD patients in the metaphor interpretation study were either
geared toward an alternative interpretation—neither compatible
with the metaphor nor literal—or simply revealed an inability
to produce an interpretation, thus replicating Papagno’s (2001)
results. These results suggest that patients recognized that the
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expressions presented to them were false if interpreted literally,
but may have lost the ability to search for the predicates that
would enable them to construct an alternative interpretation. For
example, patients who were unable to interpret a metaphor would
typically respond with statements such as “that makes no sense,
alcohol can’t be a crutch!” Therefore, these patients have retained
an ability to recognize whether a statement is true of the world
(i.e., that metaphors are literally false), but have difficulty making
the correct abstraction.
CONCLUSION
Davidson (1978) had proposed that metaphors invite us to appre-
ciate some fact rather than expressing it overtly. Although families
are not literally fortresses, a metaphor does call our attention to
what fortresses can possibly predicate of families. Overall, our
study suggests that the capacity to appreciate a metaphor is avail-
able to patients with AD when they can perform abstractions—
thus to go beyond literal meaning—when such metaphors have a
sufficient level of aptness.
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